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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Andrew Scott Gomez was arrested for possession of a controlled substance 
following the police’s search of a parked car in which Mr. Gomez was the driver and 
Jennifer Thompson was the passenger. Methamphetamine was found in a makeup bag 
on the passenger side of the car and on Ms. Thompson in her bra. The police also 
found a backpack with marijuana in the trunk. No methamphetamine or paraphernalia 
was found on Mr. Gomez or in the driver’s side of the car. Nevertheless, Mr. Gomez 
was arrested for constructive possession of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine.  
 At the county jail, Mr. Gomez admitted to having a pipe in his underwear, which 
had a very small amount of methamphetamine residue. The State charged Mr. Gomez 
with possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was 
not charged with possession of marijuana. Mr. Gomez proceeded to trial. The jury found 
him guilty as charged. Mr. Gomez appeals.  
 Mr. Gomez asserts three errors on appeal. First, he contends the evidence was 
insufficient to establish his constructive possession of Ms. Thompson’s 
methamphetamine. Second, he argues the district court erred by failing to instruct the 
jury that it had to unanimously agree on the specific occurrence giving rise to the 
possession of methamphetamine charge. Third, he submits the district court erred by 
admitting evidence of the backpack of marijuana. Due to these errors, Mr. Gomez 
respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction and 
remand this case for a new trial. 
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 The State filed a Complaint alleging Mr. Gomez committed the crimes of 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine and/or amphetamine, in 
violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a pipe, in violation 
of I.C. § 37-2734A. (R., pp.6–7.) The allegations arose out of a police officer’s 
investigation of a parked car behind a shopping center at approximately 2:00 a.m. 
(Prelim. Hr’g Tr. Ex., p.6, L.11–p.8, L.11.) Mr. Gomez was in the driver’s seat, and 
Ms. Thompson was in the passenger’s seat. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr. Ex., p.8, L.12–16.) After a 
drug dog alert, the police searched the car and found a zip-up pouch with 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on the passenger side. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr. Ex., 
p.35, L.22–p.38, L.6.) A backpack containing marijuana was found in the trunk. (Prelim. 
Hr’g Tr. Ex., p.38, Ls.14–21.) The police also found a very small amount of 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia in Ms. Thompson’s purse and a baggie of 
methamphetamine in her bra. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr. Ex., p.13, Ls.1–24, p.26, Ls.18–22.) 
Mr. Gomez was arrested and taken to the Ada County Jail. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr. Ex., p.19, 
Ls.9–13.) At the jail, the police found a pipe with a small amount of residue, which 
tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine, in Mr. Gomez’s underwear. 
(Prelim. Hr’g Tr. Ex., p.19, L.22–p.20, L.12.)  
 At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause for possession 
of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, and Mr. Gomez was bound 
over to district court. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr. Ex., p.43, L.23–p.44, L.23; R., pp.16, 1720–22.) 
The State filed an Information charging Mr. Gomez with possession of 
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methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 (R., pp.23–24.) The 
Information did not specify which methamphetamine Mr. Gomez allegedly possessed. 
Mr. Gomez was not charged with possession of marijuana. The State later filed an 
Information Part II charging Mr. Gomez as a persistent violator. (R., pp.28–29.) 
Mr. Gomez pled not guilty, and the case was set for trial. (R., p.27.) 
  Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of its intent to introduce evidence of the 
marijuana found in the vehicle’s trunk and Mr. Gomez’s statements about the marijuana 
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). (R., pp.78–79.) The district court held a hearing, 
and Mr. Gomez objected to the admission of the marijuana evidence. (Tr. Vol. I,2 p.43, 
Ls.13–21.) The district court reserved ruling on the marijuana evidence until trial in order 
to have “a bit more offer of proof.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.44, Ls.13–24.) Then, on the morning of 
trial, the district court ruled the marijuana evidence was admissible, even though the 
State provided no additional offer of proof. (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, Ls.11–12, Ls.15–20.)  
 At trial, the State presented evidence of more than one act of possession to 
support the possession of methamphetamine charge. Initially, Boise Police Officer 
McCarthy testified that suspected methamphetamine was found on Ms. Thompson, in 
her purse, and on the passenger side of the car in a makeup bag (the zip-up pouch). 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.101, L.21–p.102, L.8.) There was no further evidence, however, on the 
testing of the suspected methamphetamine found in Ms. Thompson’s purse. (See 
Tr. Vol. II, p.133, Ls.20–23 (Officer McCarthy stating he searched Ms. Thompson’s 
                                            
1 At the start of the preliminary hearing, the State filed an Amended Complaint changing 
“methamphetamine and/or amphetamine” to methamphetamine only. (R., pp.16, 18–
19.) 
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purse), p.164, Ls.3–6 (Officer McCarthy stating there was a bag in Ms. Thompson’s 
purse).) Rather, the State focused on the suspected methamphetamine found on 
Ms. Thompson and in the makeup bag. Officer Green, who found the makeup bag, 
conducted a NIK test of the crystalline substance inside, which tested presumptively 
positive for methamphetamine, and a forensic scientist with ISP opined that the 
substance was methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.114, L.2–p.115, L.24, p.117, Ls.5–21, 
p.135, L.19–p.137, L.19, p.180, Ls.4–11.) Officer Newell, who searched Ms. Thompson, 
found the baggie of suspected methamphetamine in Ms. Thompson’s bra. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.122, L.8–p.123, L.6.) Officer Newell did not conduct a NIK test, but the ISP forensic 
scientist opined that the substance was also methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.135, 
L.19–p.137, L.19, p.179, L.19–p.180, L.3; see also State’s Ex. 3, Item 3 and 4.)  
 Separate from the methamphetamine found on Ms. Thompson and in the 
makeup bag, Officer McCarthy testified that Mr. Gomez admitted at the jail to having a 
“meth pipe” in his underwear. (Tr. Vol. II, p.150, Ls.5–16.) It was a “pretty clean looking 
pipe” with a “very faint burnt white residue.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.154, Ls.8–15.) Officer 
McCarthy used a paper clip to scrape out the residue for a NIK test, which tested 
presumptively positive for methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.155, Ls.1–22.) The ISP 
forensic scientist opined that the pipe had a very small amount of methamphetamine 
residue. (Tr. Vol. II, p.182, L.7–p.187, L.3, p.189, L.7–p.192, L.10.)  
                                                                                                                                            
2 There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains a motion to 
suppress hearing and a pretrial conference. The second, cited as Volume II, contains 
the trial and sentencing.  
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 In addition, an audio recording of the stop also admitted at trial. (Tr. Vol. II, p.91, 
L.21–p.93, L.3, p.151, Ls.12–21; see State’s Ex. 2.3) Likewise, Officer McCarthy 
testified regarding the statements made by Mr. Gomez during the investigation. He 
testified that, during the search, Mr. Gomez denied “any knowledge of the items that 
were found.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.144, L.24–p.145, L.12.) Officer McCarthy explained that 
Mr. Gomez told him that he met Ms. Thompson at a friend’s house. (Tr. Vol. II, p.145, 
L.24–p.146, L.6; see also State’s Ex. 2, 10:40–10:50.) Mr. Gomez agreed to give 
Ms. Thompson a ride in exchange for some “crystal,” which was “street lingo” for 
methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.145, L.24–p.146, L.18; see also State’s Ex. 2, 18:00–
18:15, 27:30–27:36.)  Mr. Gomez told Officer McCarthy that he went to a friend’s house 
where Mr. Gomez, Ms. Thompson, and her friends “all smoked methamphetamine 
together.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.146, L.19–p.147, L.2; see also State’s Ex. 2, 27:01–27:12.) 
Mr. Gomez also told the police Ms. Thompson told him she had a “40,” but he continued 
to deny knowledge of the other methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.144, L.24–p.145, L.12, 
p.148, L.17–p.149, L.7, p.161, Ls.8–23; see also State’s Ex. 2, 28:18–28:25.)   
  The State also presented evidence of the marijuana at trial. Officer McCarthy 
testified that he found the backpack of suspected marijuana in the vehicle. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.144, Ls.14–23.) Officer McCarthy also testified that Mr. Gomez told him he had to take 
Ms. Thompson to a Jack in the Box to pick up some of her belongings before he gave 
her the ride. (Tr. Vol. II, p.147, Ls.3–18.) They picked up the backpack of suspected 
marijuana at the Jack in the Box, and the backpack was found by the police in the trunk. 
                                            
3 The audio recording was admitted as the State’s Exhibit 2, see Tr. Vol. II, p.91, L.21–
p.92, L.25, but later on the audio recording is inadvertently referred to as State’s Exhibit 
1, see Tr. Vol. II, p.151, Ls.12–21. It will be cited herein as “State’s Ex. 2.” 
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(Tr. Vol. II, p.147, L.19–p.148, L.1.) Further, Officer McCarthy questioned Mr. Gomez 
regarding the marijuana during his investigation, which the jury heard in the audio 
recording. (See State’s Ex. 2, 20:08–26:26.) In the audio recording, Officer McCarthy 
tells Mr. Gomez that Ms. Thompson claimed the backpack belonged to him, but 
Mr. Gomez repeatedly denies knowledge and possession of the marijuana. (See State’s 
Ex. 2, 20:08–26:26.) Mr. Gomez explained to Officer McCarthy that he took 
Ms. Thompson to pick up her belongings from a friend at the Jack in the Box and, while 
at the Jack in the Box, Ms. Thompson got a backpack from “some guy in a red truck,” 
which she put in the trunk. (See State’s Ex. 2, 20:08–26:26.) 
 In its closing statement, the State argued to the jury the multiple theories in which 
it alleged Mr. Gomez possessed methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.218, L.17–22.) The 
State asserted Mr. Gomez was guilty: (1) by admitting to smoking methamphetamine 
earlier with Ms. Thompson; (2) due to the methamphetamine found in the makeup bag 
and on Ms. Thompson; and (3) by having the pipe with a traceable residue in his 
underwear. (Tr. Vol. II, p.219, L.11–p.221, L.9.) The jury was instructed on actual and 
constructive possession. (R., p.108.)  
 The jury found Mr. Gomez guilty of possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.116–17.) Mr. Gomez admitted to the 
persistent violator enhancement. (Tr. Vol. II, p.229, L.9–p.233, L.2.) The district court 
sentenced Mr. Gomez to ten years, with two years fixed, for possession of 
methamphetamine. (R., pp.120–22.) Mr. Gomez filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the 
district court’s Judgment and Commitment. (R., pp.126–27.)  
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ISSUES 
1. Did the State present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
Mr. Gomez’s constructive possession of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine? 
 
2. Did the district court err when it failed to give a unanimity instruction for the 
possession of methamphetamine charge? 
 








The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
Mr. Gomez’s Constructive Possession Of Ms. Thompson’s Methamphetamine 
 
A. Introduction 
 The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Gomez had 
constructive possession of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine. Specifically, the State 
failed to prove the element of control because the evidence showed Ms. Thompson, not 
Mr. Gomez, had control over the methamphetamine in her bra and makeup bag. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 In State v. Southwick, 158 Idaho 173 (Ct. App. 2014), the Court of Appeals 
outlined the appellate standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence: 
 Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in 
scope. A finding of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is 
substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have 
found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera–Brito, 
131 Idaho 383, 385 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104 
(Ct. App. 1991). We will not substitute our view for that of the trier of fact 
as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the 
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 
Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684 (Ct. App. 
1985). Moreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution. Herrera–Brito, 131 Idaho at 385; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 
104. Substantial evidence may exist even when the evidence presented is 
solely circumstantial or when there is conflicting evidence. Severson, 147 
Idaho at 712; State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 50–51 (1969). In fact, even 
when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently with a 
finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it 
also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt. Severson, 147 Idaho at 
712; State v. Slawson, 124 Idaho 753, 757, 864 P.2d 199, 203 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
158 Idaho at 177–78. 
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C. The Evidence Was Insufficient For Constructive Possession Because The State 
Failed To Prove Mr. Gomez’s Control Over Ms. Thompson’s Methamphetamine 
 
 To prove possession of a controlled substance, the State must show the act of 
possession and “the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance.” State v. 
Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926 (1993). “Possession of a controlled substance may be actual 
or constructive. When the accused is not in actual physical possession the State must 
show that he had such knowledge and control of the substance as to establish 
constructive possession.” State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706 (Ct. App. 1994). For 
constructive possession, “knowledge and control of the controlled substance must each 
be independently proven beyond a reasonable doubt by either circumstantial or direct 
evidence.” Southwick, 158 Idaho at 178. Moreover, “[w]here joint occupancy [of a 
vehicle] is involved,” “constructive possession cannot be inferred from the mere fact that 
the defendant occupied, with a passenger, the vehicle in which the drugs were seized.” 
Id. “[S]ubstantial evidence must exist establishing the guilt of each defendant, not 
merely the collective guilt of both; proximity alone will not suffice as proof of 
possession.” Id. The State must prove the defendant “was not simply a bystander but, 
rather, had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the substance.” 
Id. “Circumstantial evidence, other than the mere fact of possession, may be used to 
find the requisite knowledge and control.” Id.  
 Here, the State failed to present any evidence Mr. Gomez had control over the 
methamphetamine on Ms. Thompson or in the makeup bag. In State v. Burnside, the 
Court of Appeals held the evidence was insufficient to show the defendant’s dominion 
and control over the contraband, even though the defendant may have had prior control 
over the contraband. 115 Idaho 882, 885–86 (Ct. App. 1989). In Burnside, the police 
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searched a vehicle recently occupied by the defendant and a passenger. Id. at 883, 
885. The police located psilocybin mushrooms in a black bag in the vehicle. Id. The 
defendant told the police the black bag was not his. Id. at 885. However, the evidence 
suggested the defendant may have sold the mushrooms to the passenger hours earlier 
in a motel room, and the passenger declared ownership of the mushrooms. Id. Based 
on these facts, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant’s prior sale of the 
mushrooms “may have indicated that he possessed the drugs at an earlier time, but it 
does not establish that he continued to possess them after the sale was consummate.” 
Id. at 885–86. “The natural inference,” the Court of Appeals explained, was that the 
passenger, “having purchased the drugs, was the one who possessed them at the time 
they were found by the police.” Id. at 886. The defendant “would have surrendered his 
right of possession upon receiving payment.” Id. Further, the Court of Appeals noted 
that the defendant’s denial of the black bag and the prior drug sale went to knowledge, 
but neither fact established control. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the 
evidence was insufficient to show the defendant’s control of the mushrooms. Id.  
 The inverse factual scenario occurred here, but the same lack of control is 
present. The evidence showed Mr. Gomez and Ms. Thompson had an agreement for 
Mr. Gomez to receive methamphetamine in exchange for Ms. Thompson’s ride, but the 
exchange never took place. (See Tr. Vol II, p.76, Ls.14–22, p.78, L.22–p.79, L1, p.219, 
L.18–p.220, L.3, p.221, Ls.5–8.) Mr. Gomez did not give Ms. Thompson the ride, and 
Ms. Thompson never gave Mr. Gomez the methamphetamine. Just as the defendant’s 
past sale of mushrooms did not establish control in Burnside, Mr. Gomez’s future 
receipt of the methamphetamine does not establish his control here. At the time of the 
 11 
alleged offense, Ms. Thompson had exclusive control over the methamphetamine.4 
Therefore, the State failed to present sufficient evidence of Mr. Gomez’s “power and 
intent to exercise dominion and control” over the methamphetamine on Ms. Thompson 
and in the makeup bag. Southwick, 158 Idaho at 178.  
 Due to the insufficient evidence for constructive possession of 
methamphetamine, the jury verdict is invalid. Although generally a jury verdict may be 
upheld if only one of multiple factual means is not supported by sufficient evidence, 
Southwick, 158 Idaho at 182–83, the multiple means of possession here were not 
alternative factual grounds, but rather multiple incidents of criminal conduct. See Part 
II.C. The jury was not given a unanimity instruction, however, and the State never 
elected a particular theory. Without a unanimity instruction, the jury could have conflated 
the multiple incidents of criminal conduct to reach a verdict based on the supported 
element of one incident and the unsupported element of another incident. See Part II.C–
D. It is not possible to determine if the jury reached the verdict on an unsupported 
theory. See State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 301 (2000) (“In cases where it is not possible 
to determine if the jury reached the verdict on the correct or incorrect legal theory, this 
Court must vacate the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.”). Therefore, as 
                                            
4 In the audio recording of the investigation, admitted at trial, Officer McCarthy says to 
Mr. Gomez that Ms. Thompson told him that Mr. Gomez “shoved the sunglasses case 
full of meth in her bra.” (State’s Ex. 2, 24:04–24:12.) Mr. Gomez denied this, and he 
also denied that he already got the methamphetamine from Ms. Thompson and had 
given it back to her. (State’s Ex. 2, 24:12–24:30.) There was no evidence at trial on the 
truth of the matter asserted in Officer McCarthy’s statement or on the actual statements 
made by Ms. Thompson during the investigation. Besides Officer McCarthy’s hearsay 
statement, the State presented no evidence regarding Mr. Gomez’s physical possession 
of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine. As explored in Part II, the State relied on a 
constructive possession theory. 
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discussed in Part II.D, the insufficient evidence for one of the theories of possession 
coupled with absence of unanimity instruction requires that the judgment of conviction 
be vacated and this case remanded for a new trial. 
  
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Give A Unanimity Instruction For The 
Possession Of Methamphetamine Charge 
 
A. Introduction 
 The State presented more than one means of possession of methamphetamine 
to the jury. Indeed, the State alleged three separate means of possession, two actual 
and one constructive. Faced with three distinct acts, the jury should have been 
instructed it must unanimously agree on the specific incident constituting the charged 
offense. Although Mr. Gomez did not submit a proposed unanimity instruction, he 
asserts the district court’s failure to give this instruction was fundamental error.  
   
B. Standard Of Review 
 “Whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which 
[the Court] exercise[s] free review. When reviewing jury instructions, [the Court] ask[s] 
whether the instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect 
applicable law.” Southwick, 158 Idaho at 181 (citations omitted). 
  
C. The District Court Erred By Failing To Give A Unanimity Instruction Because The 
State Alleged Separate, Discrete Acts Of Possession Of Methamphetamine 
 
 “Idaho law requires a trial court to instruct a jury that, in order to convict a 
defendant, it must unanimously agree on the defendant’s guilt.” State v. Adamcik, 152 
Idaho 445, 474 (2012) (citing State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 711 (2009)); see also 
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I.C. §§ 19-2316, -2317; I.C.R. 31. As a general rule, the district court is not required to 
instruct the jury that “it must unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense.” 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 711. But there is an “important exception” to this general rule. 
Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 474–75. If the defendant “commits several acts, each of which 
would independently support a conviction for the crime charged,” the district court must 
instruct the jury “that it must unanimously agree on the specific occurrence giving rise to 
the offense.” Severson, 147 Idaho at 711. A unanimity instruction is required “regardless 
of whether the defendant requests such an instruction.” Southwick, 158 Idaho at 181–
82. 
 The test to determine if the alleged criminal conduct constitutes “separate, 
distinct and independent” crimes involves two inquiries. State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 
414 (1986) (quoting State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 69 (1963)). The Court must consider “the 
circumstances of the conduct” and “the intent and objective of the actor.” Id.; see also 
Southwick, 158 Idaho at 182. The actor’s intent and objective is “of particular 
importance in cases of crimes of possession, which involve knowledge or awareness of 
control over something rather than an act or omission to act.” Major, 111 Idaho at 414 
(citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 25, p. 182 (1972)). In a drug 
possession case, the Court of Appeals referenced the dual inquiry above, but also 
described the test as “whether there was ‘a distinct union of mens rea and actus reus 
separated by a discrete period of time and circumstance from any other such similar 
incident’ for each of the alleged acts of possession.” Southwick, 158 Idaho at 182 
(quoting Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 268 (Ct. App. 2000)).  
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 In Southwick, for example, the Court of Appeals held that a unanimity instruction 
was not required in a drug possession case because the record did not show separate 
periods of time or circumstances for the two alleged acts of possession. Id. at 182. The 
defendant was charged with a single count of possession of a controlled substance “on 
a single date, at a single time, and in a single location.” Id. The criminal complaint did 
not specify the means of possession. Id. At trial, the State presented evidence of two 
means of possession: (1) methamphetamine residue on a scale found between the 
driver and passenger seats of a vehicle and (2) a baggie of methamphetamine found in 
the passenger side door. Id. at 177, 182. Both of these items were found during a 
search of the vehicle after a traffic stop. Id. at 177. The Court of Appeals reasoned that 
the two alleged acts occurred at the same time and in the same location, and the 
precise place where the methamphetamine was stored in the vehicle was not 
dispositive. Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded the two acts of possession were 
alternative factual means, “not multiple incidents of criminal conduct.” Id.   
 In contrast to Southwick, the State here alleged separate, distinct, and 
independent crimes of possession. This case did not involve alternative factual means, 
but rather multiple incidents of criminal conduct. The State alleged Mr. Gomez 
possessed three varied quantities of methamphetamine in different locations and at 
different times. First, the State claimed Mr. Gomez possessed a traceable amount of 
methamphetamine residue on the pipe in his underwear. (Tr. Vol. II, p.78, Ls.3–16, 
p.79, Ls.2–3, p.150, L.1–p.158, L.11, p.182, L.7–p.188, L.22, p.220, Ls.4–25, p.221, 
Ls.8–9, p.222, Ls.14–20.) Second, the State claimed Mr. Gomez possessed some other 
unknown quantity of methamphetamine based solely on his admission that he smoked 
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methamphetamine earlier. (Tr. Vol. II, p.78, Ls.20–22, p.146, L.19–p.147, L.11, p.219, 
Ls.11–17, p.221, Ls. 1–3.) Third, the State claimed Mr. Gomez constructively 
possessed some portion of either the 20.5 grams of methamphetamine found on 
Ms. Thompson or the 3 grams in her makeup bag. (Tr. Vol. II, p.114, L.2–p.115, L.24, 
p.117, Ls.5–21, p.122, L.8–p.123, L.6, p.135, L.19–p.137, L.19, p.179, L.19–p.180, 
L.11, p.146, Ls.7–18.) For this third occurrence, the State argued Mr. Gomez 
possessed the methamphetamine because he was going to get some “crystal” in 
exchange for the ride he was going to give Ms. Thompson. (Tr. Vol. II, p.76, Ls.14–22, 
p.78, L.22–p.79, L1, p.219, L.18–p.220, L.3, p.221, Ls.5–8.) In total, the State alleged 
three means of possession:  the traceable residue in the pipe, the unknown quantity of 
methamphetamine just prior to smoking it, and Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine. 
These were all separate, discrete acts in different locations with varied amounts, each 
of which would independently support a conviction for the charged offense.5 Moreover, 
two of the occurrences relied on an actual possession theory, while one occurrence 
relied on a constructive possession theory. “[T]he circumstances of the conduct” and 
“the intent and objective of the actor” are different for actual and constructive 
possession. See Major, 111 Idaho at 414; see also State v. King, 878 P.2d 466, 468–69 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding unanimity instruction required when the State’s 
evidence showed two distinct instances of drug possession “occurring at different times, 
in different places, and involving two different containers”: constructive possession of 
                                            
5 Mr. Gomez maintains, as argued in Part I, that his future control of the 
methamphetamine on Ms. Thompson or in the makeup bag was insufficient to prove the 




contraband in jointly occupied vehicle and actual possession of contraband on 
defendant’s person during inventory search at jail). In light of the multiple incidents of 
criminal conduct, a unanimity instruction was necessary to instruct the jury “that it must 
unanimously agree on the specific occurrence giving rise to the offense.” Severson, 147 
Idaho at 711; see also Southwick, 158 Idaho at 181–82. 
 Even if this Court determines that some of the acts were not separate and 
discrete, the State’s reliance on Mr. Gomez’s admission to smoking methamphetamine 
as one means in which to prove the charged offense required a unanimity instruction. 
This alleged incident of actual possession occurred well before the police investigation 
and search of the vehicle. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.146, L.19–p.147, L.2; see also State’s Ex. 
2, 27:01–27:12.) There is nothing in the record linking this incident to the other two 
alleged acts. Mr. Gomez’s admission to actual possession by smoking 
methamphetamine was “separated by a discrete period of time and circumstance” from 
the alleged possession of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine and the residue in the 
pipe. Southwick, 158 Idaho at 182 (quoting Miller, 135 Idaho at 268). Therefore, a 
unanimity instruction was necessary to instruct the jury on the specific act giving rise to 
the offense. 
  
D. The District Court’s Failure To Give A Unanimity Instruction Is Fundamental Error 
 Mr. Gomez did not object to the lack of a unanimity instruction at trial, so he must 
satisfy the fundamental error standard to prevail on appeal. State v. Southwick, 158 
Idaho 173, 181 (Ct. App. 2014). Under the fundamental error standard, the defendant 
must show the error “(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional 
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in 
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the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a 
tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). 
An error is not harmless “if there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
outcome of the trial.” Id. at 226. Mr. Gomez meets all three prongs of this standard.  
 First, the lack of a unanimity instruction violated Mr. Gomez’s unwaived 
constitutional rights to a unanimous jury verdict and to be free from double jeopardy. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part, “in all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution 
states in part, “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate . . . .”  IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 
7; see also I.C. §§ 19-2316, -2317; Idaho Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) 31. This section 
“guarantee[s] the right to a trial by jury, which means a jury which has not been misled 
by erroneous instructions to a defendant’s prejudice . . . .”  State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 
724, ___, 87 P.2d 454, 460 (1939). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment is also implicated by a unanimity issue. As the Court explained in Major: 
Whether a course of conduct constitutes one offense or several can be a 
troublesome question. The distinction is important: to charge a defendant 
with two offenses when only one was committed violates the defendant’s 
right against double jeopardy, U.S. CONST. amend. V; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, 
§ 13; conversely, to charge a defendant with one offense when more than 
one was committed can prejudice the defendant “in the shaping of 
evidentiary rulings, in producing a conviction on less than a unanimous 
verdict as to each separate offense, in sentencing, in limiting review on 
appeal, and in exposing the defendant to double jeopardy.” WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE &, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.2(e), p.457 (1984). 
 
111 Idaho at 414. Here, the jurors were not instructed to unanimously agree on a 
specific criminal incident of possession, nor did the State elect a particular act on which 
it would rely for the conviction. See State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 173 (Ct. App. 2004) 
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(the State’s election of act to support each charged offense rendered unanimity 
instruction unnecessary). Rather, the State argued multiple theories of possession to 
the jury in its opening statement and closing argument. (Tr. Vol. II, p.78, L.17–p.79, L.3, 
p.218, L.17–p.219, L.2, p.219, L.11–p.221, L.9.) The State claimed:  
And there are from the State’s perspective and the State’s argument in 
this case is that the defendant possessed methamphetamine in multiple 
ways. Multiple types of conduct. [sic] However, I’m not required to prove 
all of those to you. If you find that he possessed methamphetamine in one 
of these ways, two of these ways or all of these ways, the State has met 
its burden. 
 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.218, L.19–p.219, L2.) The State also asserted, “[A]ny way you shake it, 
any way you look at this, the defendant possessed methamphetamine.” (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.227, Ls.1–3.) The jurors could reasonably conclude that they could find Mr. Gomez 
guilty of possession of methamphetamine even if they disagreed on which of the 
theories of possession were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Some jurors could find 
Mr. Gomez actually possessed the traceable amount in the pipe, others could find he 
constructively possessed Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine, and still others could find 
he actually possessed methamphetamine at some unidentified place and time when he 
smoked it. The absence of a unanimity instruction for the charged offense misled the 
jury and thus deprived Mr. Gomez of his right to a unanimous jury verdict and his right 
to be free from double jeopardy.  
 Second, the error plainly exists. The jury instructions are in the record, so there is 
no need for additional information outside of the record. (R., pp.97–115.) Further, there 
is no evidence the failure to object to the instructions or put forth a unanimity instruction 
was a strategic decision. The right to a unanimous jury verdict in a felony criminal trial is 
so fundamental to the citizens of Idaho that it has been expressed in both the 
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constitution and statutes. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; I.C. §§ 19-2316, -2317; I.C.R. 31. 
Mr. Gomez gained no tactical advantage by allowing the jury to find him guilty based on 
any of the three incidents of possession. Therefore, this error is clear and obvious from 
the record. 
 Third, the error was not harmless. Mr. Gomez presented different defenses in 
response to the State’s various theories of possession. For constructive possession, 
Mr. Gomez argued he did not have control of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine 
because he did not have any access or guarantee to receive it until after he gave her a 
ride. (Tr. Vol. II, p.224, L.7–p.225, L.5.) For actual possession, Mr. Gomez argued the 
traceable amount of methamphetamine in the pipe was so negligible he did not know it 
was there. (Tr. Vol. II, p.225, Ls.9–25, p.226, Ls.4–6.) “[W]hen it appears that there is a 
genuine possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction may occur as the result of 
different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different acts,” a specific 
unanimity instruction is required. Gain, 140 Idaho at 172. Here, due to the State’s 
various theories plus Mr. Gomez’s different defenses, the jury could have reached a 
guilty verdict while disagreeing on the specific act of possession. See King, 878 P.2d at 
469 (lack of unanimity instruction not harmless due to conflicting evidence of 
constructive and actual possession). Thus, there is a reasonable possibility the absence 
of a unanimity instruction affected the outcome of the trial. 
 Moreover, this error was not harmless because one of the State’s theories was 
not supported by sufficient evidence. As argued in Part I, the State failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Gomez had constructive possession of Ms. Thompson’s 
methamphetamine. Generally, reversal is not required “when one of the alternative 
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factual means of meeting an element of the charged crime is not supported by sufficient 
evidence.” Southwick, 158 Idaho at 182 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals 
reasoned, “[I]f there are two possible factual grounds for the jury’s verdict, one 
reasonable and the other unreasonable, we will assume, absent a contrary indication in 
the record, that the jury based its verdict on the reasonable ground that is supported by 
sufficient evidence.” Id. at 183 (emphasis added). Here, however, State alleged multiple 
incidents of criminal conduct, not simply alternative factual grounds. It is reasonable to 
conclude the jury found Mr. Gomez guilty based on a combination of elements from two 
or more separate, discrete criminal incidents. See Luke, 134 Idaho at 301 (“In cases 
where it is not possible to determine if the jury reached the verdict on the correct or 
incorrect legal theory, this Court must vacate the conviction and remand the case for a 
new trial.”). In light of the insufficient evidence, plus the State’s various theories, there is 
a reasonable possibility the lack of a unanimity instruction affected the outcome of the 
trial. 
 Because the district court’s failure to give a unanimity jury instruction clearly 
violated Mr. Gomez’s constitutional rights to a fair trial and to be free of double jeopardy, 
and because this error affect the outcome of the trial, Mr. Gomez submits that the 








 Mr. Gomez asserts the district court erred by admitting evidence of the backpack 
of marijuana at trial. He raises two challenges to the district court’s evidentiary ruling. 
First, he contends the State provided an inadequate offer of proof to show the evidence 
was admissible. Second, even if the State’s offer of proof was adequate, Mr. Gomez 
argues the evidence was not relevant for any proper purpose and should have been 
excluded.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 This Court reviews questions regarding the admissibility of 
evidence using a mixed standard of review. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 
139, 143 (2008). First, whether the evidence is relevant is a matter of law 
that is subject to free review. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569 (2007). 
Second, [the Court] review[s] the district court’s determination of whether 
the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect for an 
abuse of discretion. Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143. 
 
State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907 (2015). 
 
C. The District Court Erred By Admitting The Marijuana Evidence Because, At The 
Time Of Admission, It Was Not Relevant To Prove The Charge Of Possession Of 
Methamphetamine  
 
 “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” 
I.R.E. 404(b). The prohibition on other bad acts evidence “has its source in the common 
law. The common law rule was that the doing of a criminal act, not part of the issue, is 
not admissible as evidence of the doing of the criminal act charged.” State v. Grist, 147 
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Idaho 49, 52 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “This evidence of 
prior misconduct ‘may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident . . . . ’” State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8 (2013) (quoting I.R.E. 404(b)).  
 The Court applies to two-part standard when reviewing the district court’s 
admission of other bad acts evidence. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho at 913. First, “whether, under 
I.R.E. 404(b), the evidence is relevant as a matter of law to an issue other than the 
defendant's character or criminal propensity,” and second, “whether, under I.R.E. 403, 
the district court abused its discretion in finding the probative value of the evidence was 
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” Id. 
(quoting Joy, 155 Idaho at 8).  
 “Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.’” State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2007) 
(quoting I.R.E. 401). Under Rule 404(b), the evidence must be “relevant as a matter of 
law to an issue other than the defendant’s character or propensity.” Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 
at 913. It must be “relevant to the charged offense.” Id. (quoting Joy, 155 Idaho at 9).  
 “Reliance on an oral or written offer of proof in determining the admissibility of 
Rule 404(b) evidence is one way that a district court can make the requisite initial 
finding that a prior bad act is established as fact.” State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 215 
(Ct. App. 2009). The district court “may also rely on affidavits, stipulations by the parties, 
live testimony, or may hold more extensive evidentiary hearings for each witness in 
advance of trial.” Id. “[I]n considering the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b), a 
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trial court must determine that there is sufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
conclusion that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” Id. 
 In this case, Mr. Gomez asserts the State’s written and oral offers of proof were 
insufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that Mr. Gomez knew of the contents of 
the backpack. Further, assuming the offer of proof was sufficient, Mr. Gomez asserts 
evidence of marijuana was irrelevant to any element of charged offense of 
methamphetamine. Each argument will be addressed in turn. 
 First, the State provided an insufficient offer of proof regarding Mr. Gomez’s 
knowledge of the contents of the backpack. In the State’s written notice, the State 
simply argued it “would introduce this evidence to directly prove an element of the crime 
of possession of a controlled substance, to demonstrate knowledge, intent to possess, 
preparation, plan, knowledge and/or the absence of mistake.” (R., p.79.) At the pre-trial 
hearing, the State explained: 
 With respect to the 404(b) evidence that the State is requesting to 
introduce at trial, there was a backpack full of marijuana located in the 
trunk of the vehicle that the defendant was driving. The State doesn’t 
actually intend to introduce the physical marijuana at trial, but the State is 
requesting to introduce the fact that there was marijuana and a stop on 
this kind of – this path that the defendant and [Ms. Thompson] took 
throughout the night prior to their stop to pick up this marijuana that was in 
the backpack. 
 And so the State intends to use the marijuana evidence to show 
essentially lack of mistake and knowledge as to what exactly was going on 
through this course of conduct. I would be happy to give the Court more 
information if you need that. 
 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.42, L.9–p.43, L.1.) Mr. Gomez objected: 
With respect to the marijuana, Judge, it is not clear to me – well, the 
defendant said to the officer right before he was being arrested that he 
had no knowledge of what was in the backpack. And so we don’t believe 
that that should be admissible as well it is also a prior bad act. I 
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understand the State is wanting to introduce that to show knowledge, but it 
is not clear to me that he had knowledge. 
 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.43, Ls.12–21.) The district court reserved ruling on the marijuana evidence 
until trial: 
 As to whatever else was found and what the stops were, I think it is 
closely tied in time. I think it would be helpful at the time of trial to perhaps 
provide a bit more information on the factual circumstances of that. I 
mean, I know it was found when the car was searched. I also know from 
having done a motion to suppress that he talked about borrowing the car 
and he talked about being there to drive it. And so I think it would be 
helpful to have a bit more offer of proof at the time of trial. So we will defer 
to that.  
 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.44, Ls.13–23.) The district court went on to add, “I think a little bit more 
information on the State’s theory and the facts besides the fact that it was simply found 
would be useful.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.45, Ls.1–4.) Then, on the morning of trial, without an 
additional offer of proof from the State, the district court ruled the marijuana evidence 
was admissible:  
The issue of course is possession. It is all part of the same act, same 
scene, and it is relevant and admissible. And I don’t think any prejudicial 
effect outweighs its probative value. I think it is part of the entire picture in 
this case. It is relevant to the issues brought before the jury.  
 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.6, Ls.15–20.)  
 Considering the State’s offer of proof, the district court’s initial concerns 
regarding the State’s offer of proof to establish the relevance of the marijuana were 
valid. For example, in State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356 (1995), the Court held that bags of 
unidentified white powder were not relevant to a charge of possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to deliver because, at the time of admission, the State 
offered no proof that the white powder contained cutting agents. Id. at 358. Here, the 
State provided an insufficient offer of proof regarding Mr. Gomez’s knowledge of the 
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contents of the backpack. At most, the State’s offer of proof indicated Mr. Gomez drove 
Ms. Thompson to pick up the backpack, but no evidence showed Mr. Gomez knew what 
was inside. Similarly, the State’s contention that Mr. Gomez drove Ms. Thompson to 
pick up the backpack, with nothing more, does not show some kind of joint plan. 
Besides conclusory remarks, the State provided no information on Mr. Gomez and 
Ms. Thompson’s alleged “course of conduct.” (See Tr. Vol. I, p.42, L.9–p.43, L.1.) 
Ultimately, the State failed to show the marijuana evidence was relevant to the charge 
of possession of methamphetamine. As such, the district court’s subsequent ruling that 
the evidence was “part of the same act, same scene” and “part of the entire picture” was 
improper because the State never provided an additional offer of proof to address the 
district court’s initial concerns. Therefore, based on the State’s offer of proof at the time 
of admission, the district court should have excluded the marijuana evidence as 
irrelevant. See Seitter, 127 Idaho at 358. 
 Second, even if the State’s offer of proof was sufficient, the marijuana evidence 
was not relevant to any issue other than Mr. Gomez’s criminal propensity. The mere 
presence of one drug is not relevant to show the knowledge or possession of another. 
That is nothing more than propensity evidence. Whether Mr. Gomez knowingly 
possessed methamphetamine is not made more or less probable based on the 
presence of marijuana, absent an assumption of criminal propensity. Thus, the 
presence of marijuana in a backpack in the vehicle’s trunk was irrelevant, and the 
district court erred by admitting this evidence.  
 Even if Mr. Gomez had some knowledge of the contents of the backpack, any 
knowledge of that marijuana does not make it more or less probable Mr. Gomez had 
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knowledge or control of the methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals has recognized 
“the possession of other contraband or cutting agents” could be used as circumstantial 
evidence to show the requisite knowledge and control to prove constructive possession. 
Southwick, 158 Idaho at 178. But here, there was no evidence that Mr. Gomez had any 
knowledge of the contents of the backpack. Mr. Gomez repeatedly denied knowledge 
and possession of the marijuana. (See State’s Ex. 2, 20:08–26:26.) Thus, the marijuana 
evidence only showed Mr. Gomez’s propensity to commit a drug offense, an 
impermissible purpose under I.R.E. 404(b). See Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 230 (“Merely 
because [the defendant] dealt smaller amounts of methamphetamine in the past does 
not lead to the conclusion he knew there was a pound of the substance under his car 
seat. Thus, the statements were highly prejudicial.”). Therefore, the district court erred 
as a matter of law by admitting the marijuana evidence. 
 Finally, the State cannot prove the admission of the marijuana evidence was 
harmless error. Because Mr. Gomez objected, (Tr. Vol. I, p.43, Ls.12–21), the State has 
the burden to prove the admission of the evidence was harmless. Joy, 155 Idaho at 11. 
“To meet that burden, the State must ‘prove[ ] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Id. (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010)); 
see also Idaho Criminal Rule 52 (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does 
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”). The State cannot meet its burden to 
show harmless error in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Gomez respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s 
judgment of conviction and remand his case for further proceedings.  
 DATED this 29th day of September, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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